パーフィット Reasons and Persons （1984） 序文

Reasons and Persons

Like my cat, I often simply do what I want to do. I am the not using an ability that only persons have. We know that there are reasons for acting, and that some reasons are better or stronger than others. One of the main subjects of this book is a set of questions about what we have reason to do. I shall discuss several theories. Some of these are moral theories, others are theories about rationality.
　We are paticular people. I have my life to live, you have yours. What do these facts involve? What makes me the same person throughout my life, and a differnt person from you? And what is the importance of these facts? What is the importance of the unity of each life, and of the distinction between different lives, and different persons? These questions are the other main subject of this book.
　My two subjects, reasons and persons, have close connections. I believe that most of us have false beliefs about our own nature, and our identity over time, and that, when we see the truth, we ought to change some of our beliefs about what we have reason to do. We ought to revise our moral theories, and our beliefs about rationality. In the first two parts of the book I give other arguments for similar conclusions.
　I shall not describe, in advance, these arguments and conclusions. The List of Contents provides a summary. The book is long, and sometimes complicated. I have therefore separated my arguments into 154 parts, and given each part a descriptive title. I hope that this makes the arguments easier to follow, and shows what the book contains more clearly than an Index of Subjects could. If I had not rearranged the arguments into these separate parts, such an Index would have been too thick with references to be of much use.
　Many introductions to books of this kind try to explain the central concepts that are used. Since it would take at least a book to give a helpful explanation, I shall waste no time in doing less than this. My central concepts are few. We have reasons for acting. We ought to act in certain ways, and some ways of acting are morally wrong. Some outcomes are good or bad, in a sense that has moral relevance: it is bad for example if people become paralyzed, and we ought, if we can, to prevent this. Most of us understand my last three sentences well enough to understand my arguments. I shall also use the concept of what is in someone's self-interest, or what would be best for this person. Though most of us also understand this concept, some introductory remarks may help. I make a few remarks on page 4, and a few more in Appendix 1. My last central concept is that of a person. Most of us think we understand what persons are. Part Three claims that we do not.
　Many introductions also try to explain how, when discussing morality, we can hope to make progress. Since the best explanation would be provided by making progress, this is the only explanation I shall try to give.
　Strawson describes two kinds of philosophy, descriptive, and revisionary. Descriptive philosophy gives reasons for what we instinctively assume, and explains and justifies the unchanging central core in our beliefs about ourselves, and the world we inhabit. I have great respect for descriptive philosophy. But by temperament, I am a revisionist. Except in my dreary Chapter 1, where I cannot avoid repeating what has been shown to be true, I try to challenge what we assume. Philosophers should not only interpret our beliefs; when they are false, they should change them.

http://www.amazon.co.jp/gp/reader/019824908X/ref=sib_rdr_toc?ie=UTF8&p=S00C&j=0#reader-page

Bernard Williams の書評
Personal Identity　　　　　
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v06/n10/bernard-williams/personal-identity