ジョン・ダワーさんが語る「政権 何が問われるのか」

日経新聞で11日から連載が始まった「政権　第一部」。1面の特集記事を補足するように5面に識者のインタビュー記事が載っていますが、本日は日本近代史が専門のジョン・ダワーさんでした。

このインタビューの詳細の、何と原文が、親切にも日経ネット PLUS のＨＰで読めます。とても有難いことです。

Q. Why was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) able to maintain one of the longest ruling powers in the world? Was it because the Japanese generally do not favor drastic change, or rather because of the external factor, namely the Cold War?

A. The long domination of the LDP really traces back to before the party was formed in 1955. It has its roots in the establishment of a conservative electoral majority under Shigeru Yoshida in early 1949. Strong later LDP prime ministers like Hayato Ikeda (1960-64) and Eisaku Sato (1964-72) were known as members of the "Yoshida school (Yoshida gakko)" and followed the guidelines Yoshida established: (1) close alignment with the U.S. in the Cold War, and (2) growing the economy as rapidly as possible. Ensuring security and delivering economic growth were the keys to LDP success.

　 Yoshida was contemptuous of the labor movement and political left, and neither he nor his successors were very interested in political "democracy" per se. When Yoshida consolidated power beginning in 1949, it was in the context of the famous "reverse course" in U.S. policy toward occupied Japan. "Demilitarization and democratization" gave way to repressing the political left, promoting economic reconstruction, and consolidating Japanese support of anti-Communist "containment" in Asia. By 1950, this new agenda included remilitarization and integration with U.S. military policy.

　 Catch-phrases like "reverse course," "Yoshida school," "containment," etc. are clichés that suggest the essence of conservative power in these formative years. What they do not capture is the remarkable economic transformation that took place under LDP rule beginning in the late 1950s and continuing through the 1980s, and the wide-ranging social and cultural changes that accompanied this. Ever since the Meiji Restoration, it seems to me, the Japanese have in fact embraced "drastic change."

Q. What were merits and demerits of the LDP's long-lasting rule?

A. The most obvious positive legacy is economic prosperity. Compared to most other developed nations, including my own, Japan's postwar prosperity has been quite equitably distributed. Obviously, this prosperity reflects hard work, sacrifice, energy and innovation on the part of the Japanese people themselves. But through the 1980s the LDP played a major role in promoting and guiding this. When we recall the misery and poverty in Japan in the early postwar era, this is a very impressive accomplishment.

　 At the same time, rapid economic growth itself was accompanied by terrible costs that the LDP could have done much more to alleviate. Employees at all levels were exploited, often at great cost to personal and family well-being. High growth went hand-in-hand with enormous environmental degradation. Graft, corruption, and "crony capitalism" became institutionalized. Once prosperity was attained, moreover, the party seemed to run out of talent. It was effective in practicing "catch-up" economic growth, but close to hopeless when it came to responding to new and unprecedented challenges.

　Politically, the domination of a single party for over a half-century drained both the LDP and opposition parties of creativity. The other side of the conservatives' success is the failure of liberals, social democrats, and others to organize effectively or articulate a compelling alternate vision.

　Internationally, the LDP's failure is more subtle and, again, can be traced back to Yoshida. Obviously, the close relationship with the U.S. that Yoshida promoted after a horrendous war is something to be treasured. At the same time, however, ever since Yoshida the governments' attitude toward the U.S. has been deferential to the point of obsequiousness.

　On great and controversial issues like the containment of China, nuclear proliferation, the Vietnam War, and the invasion of Iraq, Japan's LDP leaders could always be relied on to echo whatever official Washington was saying. In my view, this has been harmful to Japan as well as to the U.S., which needs allies capable of challenging it when its policies are flawed -- as they often are.

　Another gross "demerit" of LDP rule is the party's protracted failure to produce the statesmanship that would contribute to reconciliation with nations like China and Korea where matters such as war crimes are concerned. There were many concrete occasions in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s where these matters could and should have been addressed more seriously. That these matters remain open wounds six decades after the war is a tragedy.

Q. Do you think Japan's conservatism has lost its raison d’être as a result of the fall of Communism? Neo-conservatism in the U.S. is also losing its influence. Is this a global trend?

A. The LDP's "raison d’être" was really two fold. One part was anti-Communism. The other part was capitalism. As it happened, both the Soviet Union and the so-called Japanese economic miracle collapsed at almost exactly the same time, the very beginning of the 1990s. And now, of course, capitalism is experiencing a profound global crisis.

　 Where the economy is concerned, the LDP and its conservative allies do not seem to have much of a clue. They were very effective in practicing "catch-up" capitalism, but seem almost paralyzed when it comes to responding to new and unprecedented challenges. It is, after all, almost two decades since the bubble burst in Japan. What is frightening, however, is that no one else seems to know what to do either. This is hardly a failure peculiar to LDP.

　 The collapse of Communism has simply led Japan, like the U.S. to find replacement enemies. For the U.S., the "war on terror" replaced the Cold War. For the LDP -- and perhaps for most Japanese -- North Korea and probably China as well are the projected new threats, and there is also U.S. agreement on this.

　 Conservatism in our two countries may be going through hard times, but it is far from dead.

Q. Some argue that Japan's politics in reality has been controlled by bureaucrats. What is your view? Do you think genuine democracy has been established in Japan?

A. Many years ago, the political scientist Junnosuke Masumi coined the phrase "the 1955 system" to describe the consolidation of conservative power that took place in 1955. This postulated a ruling tripod comprised of the LDP, the bureaucracy, and big business. Of course this is an over-simplification, but it points to where power lies.

　 I do think Japan is a genuine democracy in important ways. It respects rule of law, encourages freedom of expression, practices electoral politics, and supports a dynamic market economy. At the same time, it is also a dysfunctional democracy in conspicuous ways -- including one-party rule since 1950s.

　 "Genuine democracy" is a highly idealized concept. It includes meaningful institutional checks-and-balances. It also assumes real grassroots engagement in the political process. The latter is rare -- but there were moments in Japan's postwar history where this took place. One brief interlude was immediately after the war, before the reverse course. Another was the various "citizens' movements" (shimin undo) of the 1960s and early 1970s, focusing on environmental, nuclear, and antiwar activities. The success of the LDP, of course, resides party in co-opting or repressing these movements.

　 I would emphasize, however, that I do not regard the dysfunction or shallowness of Japanese democracy as particularly unusual. Comparative points can be made about the myths and limitations of "democracy" in America, where critics also use concepts such as "managed democracy."

Q. Some argues that LDP's decline could affect the U.S.-Japan alliance negatively, since the LDP has been advocating strong U.S.-Japan security ties. What is your view? And what are the role and the ideal form of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post Cold War era?

A. There is no question that the U.S. welcomed and actively supported the long rule of the LDP. We know, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pumped money into Japan to support the party during the premiership in Nobusuke Kishi (1957-60), and this almost certainly took place before and after that. The LDP, after all, has been thoroughly reliable in supporting U.S. military policy including the neo-colonization of Okinawa, bases in Japan, nuclear proliferation, and the wars in Indochina and, now, the Middle East.

　 I myself did not and do not endorse those policies. Years ago, I had some hope that postwar Japan could build on its wartime experience and play an influential role in promoting demilitarization and denuclearization in Asia. For a while, I even hoped that the more egalitarian dimensions of the Japanese "economic model" might prevail over the U.S. style of winner-take-all "free market" capitalism. I still think Japan would have enhanced its global stature if it had made more serious efforts in such directions.

　 In any case, I do not think close relations between Japan and U.S. -- or between the Japanese people and Americans -- are in jeopardy no matter what happens to the LDP. What is desirable is that future Japanese governments have a vision of peace and a commitment to address urgent global issues that will embolden them to oppose U.S. policies on principle whenever that seems appropriate.

　 The problem is that I have no idea where such a vision could come from in present-day Japan.

Q. You have been following Japan's policies for a long time. What was the most memorable event? What is the biggest change you have seen?

A. I tend to think about these things as a historian rather than a political scientist who hollows day-to-day politics. And much of my research has addressed U.S.-Japan relations in the war years and early postwar period. Writing about the war was exhausting.

　 The misunderstandings, hatred, and murderous violence were overwhelming. When I immersed myself in the immediate postwar period, on the other hand, I was deeply impressed with the extraordinary resilience, imagination, discipline, and seriousness with which Japanese at all levels of society threw themselves into the talk of starting over in a shattered land. They asked big questions about the meaning of a "good" society. In one way or another, even in the midst of hardship, most of them threw themselves into what used to be called "democratization." The people were more impressive than the politicians.

　 Some of that grass-roots spirit carried over into the early years of the LDP. But it didn't last. And we are faced with the irony that the prosperous Japan of today somehow seems to have lost direction. With some exceptions, particularly in the arts and popular culture and certain cutting-edge technologies, affluence has been accompanied by emptiness.

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